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 Newman's Anti-Liberalism* 
 
 
 Prelude: Dressing Up and Dressing Down 
 
 We all know the story: the decidedly gullible, definitely vain, and 
perhaps borderline senile emperor requisitions from the master-tailors 
of the kingdom a new suit of clothes sufficient to his stature and 
calculated to amaze and inspire the populace on the day of the parade. 
The emperor's vanity is such that clothes bearing any connection with 
the erstwhile are rejected; the people's fear ─ especially that of the 
surrounding entourage ─ is such that the emperor must have his 
despotic desire satisfied. Gullibility and vanity, it appears, go hand in 
hand, for the emperor shows himself vulnerable to suggestion, the last 
weapon in the arsenal of the tyrannized. In any event, the emperor 
proceeds to get fitted with an ensemble that provokes the enthusiastic 
applause of all those consulted and for weeks before the parade 
submits docilely to tucks and adjustments, additions and subtractions 
of what might plausibly have been ruffs, and so on. On the day of the 
parade everything is ready: the garment is absolutely splendid, a work 
of art, and though the surrounding entourage have as much trouble 
describing it as theologians have describing God, this neither stops 
nor detracts from a praise that makes up in gush and emotion what it 
lacks in descriptive precision. Of course, everyone knows what 
happens, and everyone is equally well acquainted with the hero of the 
tale, i.e., the unspoiled child, emblem of candor and honesty. It is the 
child who breaks fear's spell, and the child breaks it once and for all 
without any negotiation. The child does not say: perhaps the emperor's 
clothes are not too regal after all; that maybe the tailor is the slightest 
bit suspect; or a little more bravely, that the emperor's clothes are a 
little too decollete. No, the child exclaims: ``The emperor has no 
clothes.'' Each reader, each hearer, hears the  
*This paper was presented as a talk to the Sacred Heart University Philosophy 
Club on April 25, 1991. 
hushed silence, the isolated titters generating pockets of barely 
suppressed giggles, in turn giving way to the seamless unity of 
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 Nothing in the story demands that one reads it as more than a 
parable of the encounter of vanity and candor in everyday life. 
Certainly, there is nothing in the story that forces a religious 
interpretation. By the same token nothing prevents it either. Given the 
general iconoclastic function of the child, and the fact that the child 
brings the populace over the brink of belief into non-belief in the 
tokens of royalty, it is tempting to think of the child as the 
Enlightenment philosophe, the one who reveals to his contemporaries 
that the gestures of the religious ancien regime are ``thread-bare'' in a 
quite literal sense. This emblem tells it as it is, and he does so making 
his particular community or society aware of its conspiracy in 
perpetuating an illusion. Or perhaps one ought to say: this child 
divides, repeats himself, for the forever young ``child'' has been 
around awhile. He pointed at the emperor in the eighteenth century, 
and there the first titters were heard, which in due course became a 
laughter that infected all of Europe. 
 Now, while undoubtedly the immediate and direct relevance of 
the above story (especially with its tentative religious translation) for 
our topic, i.e., Newman's anti-liberalism, is relatively transparent, yet, 
it must be admitted, the story in its original form does not orbit near 
enough to what I wish to say about Newman and the general context 
of his enterprise to be truly illuminating. But true to the native 
promiscuity and/or fertility of story, the original can be thought to 
propose or propagate another story as a supplement. This story 
suggests itself so naturally that one is tempted to the conceit that the 
author of the original penned it also, or that at least he had meant to 
write it, but unfortunately finitude intervened. So in the spirit of that 
other Dane who continually added story supplements, let me offer a 
hypothetical reconstruction of this supplemental text. 
 The story opens some years later. ``Emperor'' is now a word with 
a less than exact denotation. All that remains in memory is the frayed 
tale of the final reclusive years of a notable once routed by laughter. 
This laughter also derailed in an essential way what he had stood for, 
so the forms of influence and government had changed completely. 
The political organization is distinctly democratic, though when the 
need arises ─ and this is usually infrequent ─ the remnants of ``royal 
blood'' are trotted out, which is society's courteous way of putting out 
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the red carpet. This society still likes parades, though needless to say 
the ultimate aim of the parade has hardly changed at all: its general 
purpose still is self-glorification through basking in one's own 
reflected image. However, what has changed radically is the means by 
which one achieves this self-appropriation. The means are those of 
minimalism. The object is no longer to be dressed up in the allegory 
of power, or to be this allegory, but rather to march naked. In fact the 
dignitaries are in secret competition to demonstrate just how naked 
they live, which they hope will be revealed by uniform skin color. It 
so happened that this year the leader of the parade is the grown-up 
version of the iconoclastic child ─ call him big Hans ─ who felt he 
could get a fair share of the applause from the lightly-clad but not 
quite naked populace lining the street. The dignitaries file past the 
viewing stand, wave to the crowd, and so on. But somewhere a voice 
which sounded cracked, an old man's voice, is heard, perhaps only 
after long repetitions: ``But everyone is wearing clothes and big Hans 
is more clothed than anyone else.'' Someone tries to silence the old 
man, but the crowd has caught fire: ``There are ruffs and puffs 
everywhere, velvet and silk, and gaudy hats: one could gorge on it.'' 
 Undoubtedly, it is time to give the moral of the story supplement: 
if the spell of unprecedented clothes is dispelled by the child, the spell 
of no clothes is dispelled by the old man. Now, if we think of the first 
dispelling as the forever young Enlightenment laughter at the illusions 
of religion, its ceremonies, dogmas, beliefs, its unmasking of a social 
reality already moribund, we can think of the second dispelling as the 
revelation that the posture of Enlightenment nakedness is a conceit. 
Tolerant or intolerant of religion it is dressed up in all kinds of 
presumption, all the more dangerous because they are denied. The 
unmasking of the unmaskers begins with Romanticism in the early 
nineteenth century, and without, as well as within, Christianity it has 
become a favorite twentieth-century scholarly preoccupation. But our 
interest here is the nineteenth century, and I wish to bring forward the 
candidacy of someone other than Hegel as ``old man,'' for such the 
famous German philosopher was called by his schoolmates from a 
very early age. At this point story and topic meet. Another nineteenth 
century ``old man'' is John Henry Newman, who shows us, as perhaps 
the Enlightenment before him had also, that an inescapable part of 
telling it as it is is pointing out how it is not. With respect to religion, 
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specifically Christianity, Newman had little choice: the enlightened 
child has been believed, and frightened Christian adults have 
modified Christianity to the point of non-recognition, attenuated it to 
the point of non-being. Newman's view of the nature of religion and 
its function, as well as his view of the self, will involve denial of a 
view or views which either, implicitly or explicitly, manifest 
commitment to the Enlightenment or its heritage. That is, Newman 
will be involved in a critique of Enlightened or liberal religion 
whatever form that takes, and he realizes as well as anyone in the 
nineteenth century just how chameleon-like it is in appearance.  
 
 Newman's Anti-Liberalism Thesis 
 
 While I definitely wish to claim that Newman can be considered 
as having made a significant contribution in the nineteenth century 
towards the critique of Enlightened or liberal religion, I also wish to 
say something perhaps more bold, quite definitely something more 
controversial. I will go so far as to claim that anti-liberalism represents 
the hermeneutic key that unlocks his entire oeuvre, Anglican or 
Catholic, even if the form Newman's act of resistance takes in these 
dispensations may differ considerably. Certainly Newman's own 
gestures at summing up his contribution to religious thought do 
nothing to obstruct this interpretation. In the acceptance speech of the 
cardinalate in 1879 Newman avowed that the consistent theme of his 
life's work was anti-liberalism in matters of religion. Newman was not 
unaware that the content of, indeed the referent of, ``liberal religion'' 
had changed over the course of the century: for one thing liberalism in 
religion, specifically Christianity, is, he opines, now more atmospheric 
than a position actually argued for in the public forum. Neither 
Newman's general avowal nor the suggestion of metamorphosis in the 
shape or form liberalism took in religion can be regarded as eccentric. 
Earlier in the Apologia, for instance, Newman proposed a similar 
self-interpretation and offered a similar interpretation of the change in 
denotation of ``liberalism'': what once could be identified with the 
views explicitly espoused by a particular party had now become 
ethos; what once had been argument now had become presupposition, 
the presupposition in this case of what Newman thought best 
nominated as ``a deep plausible skepticism.'' Despite, or perhaps 
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precisely because of, the change, Newman wished to insist on 
continuity. The change is a change of accidents rather than substance. 
Newman also wished to insist upon the dangers. The mutated form is 
potentially the more destructive because more insidious and 
intangible. In the Apologia Newman seems to have something of the 
experience of Hegel who sees the contemporary form of the 
Enlightenment less as an identifiable other than as an infected 
cognitive and affective environment (The Phenomenology of Spirit). 
 In due course we will undoubtedly have more to say about 
Newman's view of the pathology of the Enlightenment. What I wish 
to underscore at this juncture is the simple fact that Newman provides 
some warrant at least for the plausibility of the view that 
anti-liberalism represents the hermeneutic key for his work as a 
whole. But why be so circumspect? Why not say that Newman's 
express pronouncements prove that anti-liberalism is indeed the 
hermeneutic key? There are essentially two reasons, one general, the 
other quite specific to Newman. The general reason is that it is not 
always safe to take authors at their word: while authors by no means 
are always liars, they are often self-deceived. The specific reason is 
the power of Newman's rhetoric, especially in the Apologia, where he 
enjoins a certain reading of his intellectual and religious vocation as 
well as a certain reading of his self. If anything, Newman is almost 
too persuasive in that text. Thus, in order to gain some measure of 
independence for interpretation, it is necessary to regard as 
hypothetical for the moment Newman's reconstruction of his own 
mission. This is not, however, to suggest skepticism, for it is quite 
possible that Newman's own construal will be affirmed. The important 
point is that his construal be veri-fied by textual assessment beyond 
Newman's own powerful voice.  
 Nevertheless, though we do not wish to be swayed by the 
Apologia, it is with this text that we must start, for it is there that 
Newman provides his most clearly drawn portrait of liberalism and its 
mutation. For Newman in its original form the features of liberalism 
stand out, though as the century moves on the quite definite features 
become effaced. Five features are either posited or suggested. 
Following Newman's own practice in the Apologia these features or 
elements may be referred to as ``principles.'' Without signifying any 
order of priority these five principles will be listed and then briefly 
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elucidated: (1) the anti-dogmatic principle; (2) the principle of rational 
method; (3) the principle of private judgment; (4) the anti-sacramental 
principle; (5) the meliorist principle. 
 For Newman the anti-dogmatic principle expressed itself in the 
propositions that no truth is possible (a) in principle or (b) in fact in 
matters of religious inquiry. In his view such propositions directly 
controverted traditional Christian understanding of the epistemic 
status of doctrines. However hedged with qualifier and caveat, 
Christian doctrines, e.g., the doctrines of Christ and Trinity, were 
understood to grant real knowledge of the divine. In the Apologia 
Newman suggests a plurality of postures which these propositions 
symptom and/or support. For instance, the proposition that no truth is 
possible in principle supports both vituperative skepticism and the 
slackest conventionalism, just as the weaker proposition that no truth 
is possible in fact supports or symptoms both a view of generous 
religious tolerance and sheer indifference regarding religious 
differences. 
 Though liberal religion tended to be minimalist at best with 
regard to what can be known religiously, for it religious inquiry is 
authorizable to the degree to which it is governed by rational method. 
Such a method forecloses the option of religious certainty, confining 
itself to sifting the probable truth of religious opinion, where probable 
truth is determined by the weight of empirical and/or verifiable 
evidence in its favor. Evidence in turn determines subjective 
entitlements. That is, a person's level of conviction corresponds, or at 
least ought to correspond, to the level of probability provided by the 
evidence. Since evidence in religious matters is never overwhelming, 
this amounts to saying that no religious views are, or ought to be, held 
absolutely. They are, or ought to be, held merely tentatively. For 
Newman, liberal religion's epistemic humility represents a caricature 
of genuinely Christian epistemic humility. As Newman understands it, 
Christian epistemic humility is not determined by weakness of 
intellect or the lack of irresistible evidence: it is determined by the 
very nature of the objects of religion which if communicated in 
human media or channels nevertheless transcend these media or 
channels. 
 A third element (or facet) of the portrait, and thus a third 
functioning principle, is that of private judgment. The reason that 
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liberal religion endorses is not a corporate or tradition prerogative. It 
is a purely private affair. Valid judgment in religious matters resides in 
the exercise of individual reason. Now, while the proposal of rational 
method puts Christianity at the disposal of an objectivistic 
probability-evidentialist calculus, advocacy of private judgment, the 
presumed complement of the proposal of rational method, tends to 
absolve the individual from having to offer warrants of a public kind 
for his/her position. The principle of private judgment, therefore, 
shows an inherent tendency to immunize itself against critique. Thus, 
while all religious opinion is contestable in principle, individually or 
privately held opinion is not contestable in fact. Beneath the blatant 
anti-liturgical bias of liberal religion, Newman espied the operation of 
a deeper but also more pervasive logic. This logic, for which he 
suggested the label of ``anti-sacramental principle'' signified not one 
but two exclusions: (a) exclusion of any real sense of the reality or 
even possibility of a higher dimension to existence, a dimension 
Newman referred to metaphorically as the ``invisible''; (b) exclusion 
of any real and general sense of the effective life of the invisible in the 
visible. The latter exclusion was, of course, logically dependent upon 
the former, just as this latter exclusion will render incoherent ecclesial 
discourse on the sacraments as such. 
 While the existence of the fifth principle, what has been referred 
to as ``the meliorist principle,'' is not directly posited by Newman as a 
structural feature of the operation of liberal religion, its imputed 
presence is arguably a reasonable extrapolation from a knot of 
palliative gestures or strategies conspicuously present in liberal 
religion that are unambiguously denounced by Newman: (a) Liberal 
religion totally waters down (if it does not erase altogether) anything 
that smacks of sternness and fierceness in the Christian depiction of 
God. It is thereby, opines Newman, led undialectically to emphasize 
divine mercy and love; (b) In so watering Christianity, liberal religion 
confuses the essence of Christianity with one of its functions, that is, 
the function of consolation. Further evidence of the presence of an 
operation of a principle of selection and exclusion is provided by 
liberal religion's view of the human situation; (c) As with its view of 
the divine, liberal religion waters down or erases the stern side of 
Christian depiction of the human situation. Little or no place is 
granted an account of evil disposition, innate human selfishness, 
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pride, self-deception. Needless to say, in the context of such 
phenomenological attenuation a doctrine of original sin, or any 
facsimile, ceases to function. It ceases to function because it ceases to 
make sense; (d) A particularly serious consequence of such existential 
levelling is that the need for self-denial and the practice of virtue, 
needs focal in traditional Christian spirituality, are ignored if they 
have not become thoroughly incomprehensible. Newman is insistent 
in the Apologia that only against the dramatic backdrop of sin are 
virtue and holiness thrown into relief. 
 Newman's critique is, of course, the obverse of his own 
constructive counter-proposal. To each of liberal religion's principles 
he proposes its contrary. To the anti-dogmatic principle he opposes the 
dogmatic principle; the principle of rational method finds its counter 
in what might be called the principle of amplified reason; 
commitment to the principle of traditionary judgment replaces that of 
private judgment; the validity of the sacramental principle is upheld 
contrary to the claims of the anti-sacramental principle; and finally the 
rejection of the appropriateness of the meliorist principle implies the 
counter-assertion of what might be called the principle of dialectical 
or dramatic religion.  
 
 Testing the Anti-Liberalism Hypothesis: The Pre-Conversion Period 
 
 It cannot be held against Newman that he liked Cicero. Nor can 
he be put in the theological doghouse because he wrote an early, 
rather juvenile, essay on the great Roman rhetor from whom 
Augustine could not withhold his admiration. But when Newman 
praises Cicero for the naturalness and simplicity of style calculated to 
convince an audience of whatever the rhetor wishes to pass as truth, 
and later in the Apologia gives a wonderful display of precisely such 
naturalness and simplicity, we are, perhaps, better off withdrawing to 
a polite distance to take stock. So instead of being led ``by the nose,'' 
as it were, of Newman's own presentation of the evidence ─ which 
even if it were accurate would in any event be highly selective ─ let us 
take an independent look at some of Newman's texts with a view to 
ascertaining whether in fact they tend to support or belie his Apologia 
reading that anti-liberalism was constitutive of his intellectual 
self-definition. 
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 The two texts that will provide our focus and make investigation 
manageable, that is, Plain and Parochial Sermons (1825-43) and the 
famous Oxford University Sermons (1825-43), are selected in part 
because their production spanned a fairly extensive period of 
Newman's life, and in part because the form of sermon encourages, in 
a way a theological treatise does not, the enunciation of basic attitude 
as well as commentary on the contemporary state of affairs, religious 
and otherwise. Examination of both of these texts, I believe, will tend 
to support Newman's own reading and determine that methodological 
doubt remains just that and does not metamorphose into doubt of a 
substantive kind. That is, both texts corroborate the existence and 
operation of the five principles that provide the basic structural 
elements of Newman's anti-liberalism position. It is to the 
``demonstration'' of this that we now turn. Though I will have 
something to say about the presence and operation of each of these 
principles, I intend to be more ample regarding the first three. 
 With respect to the affirmation of the first principle, i.e., the 
dogmatic principle, there can be little doubt that even a cursory 
examination of Plain and Parochial Sermons reveals a Newman 
insistent on the dogmatic essence of Christian faith. Attitude, tone, 
disposition, and feeling may, Newman grants, all be important in 
Christianity and for Christianity, but, Newman asserts, such 
psychological states cannot substitute for transcendent data, that is, 
religious truths which are authoritative for the Christian community 
and ought to be believed. Though one here runs the risk of 
anachronism, Newman in that particular text could be said to resist the 
suasion of what has come to be called the ``experiential expressivist'' 
position. Though most so-called ``experientialist expressivists'' are 
extraordinarily sophisticated (e.g., Schleier-macher), in its crudest 
form experiential expressivism relocates religion and/or Christianity 
in the religious subject. In Newman's act of resistance the emphasis 
falls heavily on what might be called ``primary doctrines,'' that is 
doctrines, which if they are constitutive of the Christian community, 
nevertheless, do not involve explicit reflection on the community 
status of the doctrines. While Newman is prepared to advance the 
doctrine of regeneration through infant baptism as a primary doctrine, 
it is quite evident that his two central doctrinal foci are the doctrines 
of Christ and the Trinity. And given Newman's historical studies, there 
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is every reason to presume that these two doctrines not only are 
central but absolutely basic.  
 Plain and Parochial Sermons occupies itself with the full array of 
aspects of the doctrine of Christ, i.e., incarnation, Christ's redemptive 
act, and so on (see, for example, 2,2,3,13; 3,10-12; 4,15,16; 
6,5-7,9,10; 7,7-10). For much of what he says Newman relies heavily 
on Alexandrian Fathers like Athanasius who played such a decisive 
role in the formation of christological dogma and the creed. This 
dependence of Newman on the classical christological tradition 
encourages him ─ though in itself it does not dictate ─ to take his 
distance from the evangelical wing of Anglicanism which was willing 
only to speak of the works of Christ and eschewed altogether any 
reflection on or statement about his person. Newman insisted that talk 
of what Christ does for us both naturally involves and spontaneously 
elicits reflection on the person who is the subject of our salvation. 
This was his central point, a point incidentally quite distinct from the 
issue of the general disposition of reflection on the person of Christ, 
i.e., the issue of whether the christological disposition more nearly 
emphasizes the divine or human aspect of Christ, or takes the eternal 
Word or the passional history of Jesus as its fundamental starting 
point. 
 The other core doctrine ─ and arguably it also enjoys a similar 
status in A Grammar of Assent ─ is the doctrine of the Trinity. It seems 
to be Newman's general view that the doctrine is, from a sociological 
point of view, in an even more enfeebled state than the doctrine of 
Christ, for the latter shows evidence of some degree of survival, albeit 
in truncated form. Lack of doctrinal integrity does not cut off, for 
instance, personal appeals to Christ's work of salvation in one's life. 
Unfortunately no such similar existential factors come to the rescue of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. So, if Christ is misunderstood in spite of, or 
perhaps because of, the fact that he succeeds in being relevant for 
particular psychological states ─ usually of a positive kind ─ the 
Trinity can only be misunder-stood in the modern field of 
presumption, because it fails dismally to be subjectively relevant. 
Both the attenuation of christological discourse and the veritable 
silence regarding the Trinity reflects, from Newman's point of view, 
the dislocation of religious focus away from the religious object as 
such and its relocation on or within the religious subject. Taking his 
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cue from the Latin and Greek Fathers, Newman insists on the properly 
objective nature of Christianity. Christianity is a discourse about the 
real and not about the self. Indeed the state of health of Christian 
discourse is in part, at least, a function of just how objective it is 
prepared to be. Perhaps the real barometer of the general state of 
theological health is the role and function, if any, played by the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Not being easily resolvable into psychological 
categories, the presence of the doctrine of the Trinity in a particular 
Christian dispensation suggests a realized grasp of the properly 
``eccentric'' nature of Christianity. 
 Newman's insistence on the trans-subjective nature of the 
doctrine of the Trinity lies at the core, therefore, of his defense of the 
specifically cognitive character of this particular doctrine and by 
implication doctrines in general. However, it is quite clear that he does 
not construe this cognitive character in any straightforward 
propositionalist fashion. In Plain and Parochial Sermons Newman 
seems struck by the systemic oddness of trinitarian language (see 
2,22; 6,24,25). For the doctrine of the Trinity has worship as its 
abiding context, and this context invests trinitarian language with its 
own peculiar character. In drawing attention to this feature of 
trinitarian language, Newman seems to be doing essentially two 
things. On the one hand he is simply paying attention to the operative 
function of this language in Christian religious life outside the context 
of theological textbook and learned discussion. And on the other, he 
is, perhaps, recalling a Patristic insistence. In any event, it can be said 
that for Newman the doxological context of the proclamation of the 
Trinity as well as its actual doxological (or meta-doxological) 
character makes the doctrine religious rather than specifically 
theological. Thus understood, the doctrine no longer obstructs or cuts 
off primary relation to God, but becomes a means to engagement with 
a vital religious reality. 
 The second anti-liberal principle, that is the principle of amplified 
reason hospitable to religious mystery, also finds support in our two 
texts. If Oxford University Sermons is more perspicuous about what 
Newman is rejecting, Plain and Parochial Sermons is more 
perspicuous about what Newman is affirming. In two classic Oxford 
sermons, ``The Usurpation of Reason'' (1831) and ``Faith and Reason'' 
(1839), Newman challenges the legitimacy of evidentialism in matters 
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of religious inquiry. In both these sermons Newman suggests a mode 
of apprehension which can be regarded as other than but not 
necessarily contrary to reason, in the former calling this mode of 
apprehension ``conscience'' or ``moral sense,'' in the latter calling it 
``faith'' as he proceeds, after the high theological tradition, to interpret 
``faith'' as a gift of a supernatural kind. 
 If Plain and Parochial Sermons offers the positive complement to 
Oxford University Sermons' critique of liberal religion's rationalistic 
bias, it also shows signs of a burgeoning rethinking of the nature and 
scope of reason in matters of religion, a rethinking which comes to 
full fruition in A Grammar of Assent. In truly important sermons 
Newman proposes a more traditional epistemic humility ─ in fact a 
patristic version ─ to what, he feels, is a disingenuous rationalist 
pretender. For Newman in this period before his conversion, as after 
it, there was nothing inconsistent in holding at one and the same time 
the conviction that religious belief gives knowledge of its object and 
that the mysterious nature of this object which resists full 
disclosure(see Plain and Parochial Sermons 1,16; 2,2,18; 6,23,24). 
Newman's classic essay, ``The Christian Mysteries,'' is an attempt to 
fend off the sophism of an apparently hospitable rationalism, namely 
the view that with revelation mystery as such is abolished with the 
consequence that truth becomes transparent to a mind willing to 
proceed rationally. For Newman the hospitality of rationalism is 
spurious, and he sees in Christian willingness to accept this peace 
offering both a fatal tedium and a wondrous naivete regarding the 
logic of acceptance. Under the cloak of the embrace lies the dagger 
that gives the fatal wound. For to think of revelation in this way is 
already to conceive of revelation as if it presented information or data 
rather than persons or acts, as it is also to reduce religion to its 
use-value in accelerating the accumulation of rational wealth which, 
of course, would have accumulated in any event, though necessarily 
more slowly and laboriously. 
 Against this species of hospitable rationalism, represented by 
Locke and his epigones, Newman insisted on behalf of the Christian 
tradition that mystery is not abolished by revelation. While revelation 
does indeed propose divine truth, it does not put this proposal at the 
disposal of human beings. One intuits and accepts the truth, but never 
exercises rational control over it. With the great Alexandrian 
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dogmaticians, and perhaps after them, Newman main-tains that 
mystery is endemic to Christianity. Given its inalienable as well as 
perduring quality, mystery calls for a particular epistemic disposition 
which, if not irrational, is, nonetheless, considerably more ample than 
that suggested by liberal religion. It is hardly an accident that the 
sermon preceding that on the Christian mysteries is ``Religious Faith 
Rational'' (Plain and Parochial Sermons 1,15). 
 This brings us to the third of Newman's anti-liberal principles, 
that is, the principle of the value of traditionary judgment. In both the 
texts under consideration one finds considerable evidence of critique 
of the principle of private judgment and the constructive 
counter-proposal of the wisdom and the ineluctability of tradition. 
This time, however, the two texts seem to reverse roles with Plain and 
Parochial Sermons providing Newman's more critical, and Oxford 
University Sermons Newman's more constructive position. In a 
pre-1830, but far from plain, text called ``The Self-Wise Inquirer'' 
(Plain and Parochial Sermons, 1,17) Newman offers a classic 
expression of the denunciation of private judgment. In exegeting 1 
Corinthians 3:18-19 (``worldly wisdom''), Newman feels called upon 
to observe: ``The warning of the apostle against our trusting in our 
wisdom, may lead us through God's blessing, to some profitable 
reflection today,'' One is not sure just how profitable. For if Newman's 
reflection did bring some benefit to a confused and moribund 
religious situation, the benefit must have been quite temporary, for 
Newman continues to repeat such warnings throughout his Anglican 
period. That the problem is a chronic one is evidenced by the fact that 
Newman feels compelled as late as 1870 to condemn the arrogance of 
private judgment and its less than adequate epistemology. Of course, 
it is not until this time that Newman himself has a fully wrought 
epistemological counter-proposal. Nevertheless, A Grammar of Assent 
(1870) is but the terminus of a line of thought that is receiving 
burgeoning expression as early as the late 1820s.  
 On the constructive side one witnesses in Oxford University 
Sermons perhaps Newman's first attempt at what would now in the 
post-Gadamerian situation be called the rehabilitation of prejudice or 
prejudice as tradition. With regard to religious matters (see, for 
example, Oxford University Sermons, 10, 11) ─ Newman will 
generalize later in A Grammar ─ we do not start from scratch. We 
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inhabit or rather or inhabited by a web of presupposition we do not in 
fact submit to testing. Of course, Newman has some sense that mere 
appeal to the facts does not decide the issue, even if he was convinced 
that the proud empiricist is often not particularly empirical in his 
mode of thought. For the proponents of liberal religion might well 
agree with this description, and then call for change of our 
unreflective bad habits. Though Newman is hardly as clear and cogent 
as he will be later when he writes his great text in religious 
epistemology, he does lodge objections against the liberal prescription 
that knowledge be built slowly and meticulously from the ground up.  
 Convinced that the liberal insistence on empirical self-evidence is 
a chimera, Newman accuses liberal religion of disingenuousness and 
rhetorical over-kill. Specifically, he suggests that: (a) Liberal religion 
is imposing unrealistic requirements for faith, requirements, indeed, 
that it does not make in other walks of life and other areas of 
knowledge; (b) Liberal religion is mistaken in supposing that every 
unexamined presupposition ─ that is, every prejudice in the widest 
sense of the term ─ is a prejudice in the pejoratively narrow sense of 
the term. Not all prejudices in the broad sense reflect themselves, for 
instance, in bigotry and fanaticism. The honorable motif of countering 
such aberrations has led, Newman believes, liberal religion to restrict 
the real scope of reason, indeed contract it into a particular function, 
which Newman will later call ``inference'' (Grammar). 
 But if the value of tradition and/or prejudice can be supported on 
non-foundational (largely pragmatic) grounds, Newman thinks that 
what this might ultimately involve is nothing less than a 
reconsideration of the nature of reason, such that reason no longer 
functions as a contrast term to ``prejudice'' or ``tradition.'' But, the 
liberal might have replied ─ certainly his twentieth-century 
Habermasian offspring would reply ─ does not the validation of 
``prejudice'' and ``tradition'' leave Christians fatally exposed to the 
possibility of ideology or deformation, even granted that some aspects 
of the tradition remain wholesome? Is Christianity rationally and 
ethically sustainable in the absence of an ideology-critique apparatus? 
While Newman here cannot be claimed to deal satisfactorily with 
what is a genuine problem, he does suggest that appeal to an external 
organ of critique is unnecessary, that Christianity possesses internal 
critical resources ─ perhaps themselves traditional ─ for preventing 
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obscurantism and the emergence and maintenance of ideological 
deformation. 
 This brings us to the last two principles, and for brevity's sake our 
textual focus contracts to Plain and Parochial Sermons. Certainly that 
text offers plenty of evidence in support of Newman's fourth 
anti-liberal principle, that is, the sacramental principle. And this 
support is by no means generic. In fact Plain and Parochial Sermons 
endorses both assumptive elements that together constitute the 
sacramental principle, i.e., (1) the belief, to use Wittgenstein's 
language, that the visible is not all that is the case; and (2) the 
conviction or experience of the active presence of the invisible in the 
visible. If in a sermon called ``Invisible World'' (Plain and Parochial 
Sermons 4,13) the former aspect gets most explicitly affirmed, the 
latter aspect is arguably most explicitly affirmed in a sermon called 
``Church Visible and Invisible'' (Plain and Parochial Sermons 4,16). 
This dual affirmation grounds Newman's decidedly positive attitude 
toward liturgy in general (see, for example, Plain and Parochial 
Sermons 2,7) and the eucharist in particular. Newman was convinced 
that the sacramental life of the Church only  made sense against the 
backdrop of deeper and broader presupposition and mindset. It was 
obvious to him, for instance, that the marginalization of the 
sacraments or ``ceremonies'' of the Church, as he often referred to 
them, recommended by liberal religion, was facilitated, if not 
determined by the prior assumption of a this-worldly, non-miraculous 
view of the order of things. Therefore, to repeal marginalization 
required as a desideratum repeal of the principle which underwrites it. 
 Again, with regard to the fifth and final principle, it can 
confidently be asserted that it finds validation in Plain and Parochial 
Sermons. If any particular word hypnotically recurs in that text, it is 
that of ``holiness.'' That ``holiness'' does not function simply as a pious 
word but as a religious-theological category becomes clear when 
Newman denies, as Rudolph Otto does much later, the synonymity of 
``holiness'' and ``goodness'' in religious discourse. Accusing liberal 
religion of identifying the divine with the good, Newman, largely 
focusing on Old and New Testament theophany, suggests the 
reductiveness of this view. What liberal religion systematically fails to 
grasp is the essential bivalence of holiness. For Newman, holiness is 
not coincident with divine mercy, it also includes divine justice. 
15
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Again, before Otto, Newman suggests that a retrieval of the proper, 
that is, biblically informed, view of holiness would represent a much 
needed correction of the liberal view, which he perceives as being 
humanistically sentimental. Since wrath is as legitimate a 
characteristic of God as mercy, fear is as much an appropriate 
response to the divine as affection and gratitude. 
 Newman is equally prepared to announce the stern side of what is 
religiously and Christianly demanded of human beings. Now what is 
demanded is not simply sweet reasonableness, a sanguine temper, a 
benevolent and even altruistic disposition toward one's fellow human 
beings. One may suggest that the attitude proposed by Newman is 
best summed up in the adage: holiness not peace. The recommended 
human holiness trades off the dialectical-dramatic character of the 
``holy'' in divine epiphany. Among other things, it points to the dark 
background of sin. From Newman's point of view, any anthropology 
which excludes the negative loses all rights to be regarded as faithful 
Christian depiction. As the recom-mendation suggests sin as 
background, it points to the tension within the self and the necessity of 
a struggle that is a continuous and not a once-and-for-all-affair. The 
category of ``religious hero,'' thus, makes sense in Newman in a way it 
does not in liberal religion. Yet Christianity does not specify 
beforehand the form of heroism. In principle there exists an infinite 
vocabulary of such forms, and there is no reason to suppose that 
heroism need be attended by conspicuous signs, that heroism cannot 
function incognito. 
 
 Testing the Anti-Liberalism Hypothesis: The Catholic Period 
 
 When Newman remarked in 1879 that anti-liberalism had been 
from the beginning his essentially private and public demeanor he was 
plainly including the Catholic, i.e., post-1845, period of his life. This 
was not to say, however, that anti-liberalism and its confession was 
not complicated by a number of factors. (1) There was first ─ and here 
I recall a point made at the start of this essay ─ the fact that liberalism 
in religion as well as outside had undergone mutation. Vaporized, as it 
were, it had become the social and cultural air Christians and 
non-Christians alike breathed. Invisible and taken for granted, it had 
become all the more religiously dangerous and toxic. The assumptive 
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world of liberalism was no longer really criticized, because through 
dissemination it had essentially ceased to be criticizable. In the latter 
half of the century liberalism is not so much an object of thought or 
debate as that by which people in general, and most definitely the 
educated in particular, think. (2) There is the question of the effect, if 
any, the new context of Catholicism had on Newman's theological and 
philosophical agenda. In his Anglican period the central attraction of 
Catholicism had always been its solid sense of identity and resistance 
against liberalism. 
 These two positive notes were, of course, intimately, if 
complexly, related. If on the one hand its solid sense of identity put 
the Catholic Church in a better position than some, perhaps many, of 
the other Christian churches to engage in a successful act of 
resistance, on the other the act of resistance made a significant 
contribution to Catholic identity. Once Newman had worked through 
his aversion to Catholic popular practices, and on a specifically 
theological level come to terms with his objections to Catholic 
ecclesiology and ecclesial structure, the attraction of Catholicism 
proved irresistible. In his new-found situation, one that actually 
provided intellectual and institutional support for an anti-liberal stand, 
it would hardly be surprising if Newman, at least on occasions, found 
the need to supplement the assertion of anti-liberal principles with 
qualifiers intended to prevent too doctrinaire, too supra-rationalistic or 
fideistic a view of religion, too sacramental or transcendental a view 
of the world, too stern a view of God and the human condition. And 
this I think is the case. Anti-liberal principles are insisted on in the 
Catholic period, but on the evidence of some of Newman's later texts, 
including Apologia, Consultation of the Faithful, The Idea of a 
University, the text which trajects Newman into Catholicism, i.e., 
Essay on Development, and, of course, also and especially A 
Grammar, anti-liberal principles are asserted in such a way as to resist 
deformation. Given the length already of the present piece, it will not 
be possible, and perhaps on account of the intrinsic importance of the 
material covered, not advisable, to give even the illusion of adequate 
treatment. I will content myself, therefore, with the merest profile of 
Newman's Catholic commitment to his anti-liberal principles and their 
supplementation, and restrict my focus in essentially two ways: on the 
one hand I will concern myself only with the first three anti-liberal 
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principles, and on the other only one or two texts of Newman's 
Catholic period will come in for explicit discussion. 
 Without great fear of contradiction, it can be claimed that many 
of the texts of Newman's Catholic period validate the value, even the 
necessity of dogma. Nothing else is the task of the Essay on 
Development, and the dogma of the Trinity comes in for significant 
discussion in A Grammar, arguably because while it is a central 
doctrine for faith, it is also the doctrine that is experientially most 
remote from the average Christian believer. Now, while it is 
undoubtedly true that in both texts Newman insists that dogma 
definitely involves knowledge of God and the divine dispensation, the 
essential modesty of Newman's proposal ought to be noted. In 
eschewing liberal religion's spurious epistemic humility, he does not 
go the opposite extreme and suggest after the fashion of Scholasticism 
of a decadent sort the existence or possibility of a fully adequate 
knowledge of the divine. On intrinsic Christian, and not simply on 
apologetic grounds, i.e., grounds essentially calculated to make the 
Christian or Catholic position less vulnerable to liberal-rationalist 
critique, Newman suggests that human knowledge of the divine can 
never be fully adequate or truly comprehensive. The reality or ``fact'' 
referred to in scripture, and in doctrine which represents a discursive 
articulation of what is implied in the dense and richly suggestive 
matrix of scripture, exceeds both. 
 But as Newman makes clear when discussing the doctrine of the 
Trinity in A Grammar, a less than fully adequate grasp of the reality 
denoted by the doctrine ─ in the technical language of A Grammar, a 
failure of ``real apprehension'' ─ neither means that Christians in 
general, Catholics in particular, have no knowledge of the divine, nor 
that they fail to have an adequate enough knowledge. For Newman 
``good enough'' has to be regarded as sufficient in the absence of the 
possibility of a completely positive knowledge of the divine. Granted 
anything like a reasonable understanding of what is involved in the 
notion of God, full epistemic elucidation becomes a logical and not 
merely an empirical impossibility. This really brings us, however, to 
Newman's spirited defense of the second anti-liberal principle, i.e., the 
affirmation of mystery and the positing of a more ample conspectus 
on reason. 
 A Grammar fills in the outline of a religious epistemology first 
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sketched in the Oxford University Sermons. Newman's target is the 
same as it had been half a century earlier, but now Newman has the 
full conceptual resources to challenge liberal epistemology and take 
on Locke among others, who insisted on a perspicuous, narrow 
functioning of reason, where reason is the passive co-respondent to 
evidence. Newman in that text in particular shows himself convinced 
that Locke and his followers slight reason in so limiting the range and 
nature of its functioning, and counters by suggesting that reason 
ranges securely beyond the empirical in all kinds of matters where the 
legitimacy of such ranging is never questioned. Newman's point in A 
Grammar, of course, is not, as perhaps it might be with a 
thoroughgoing foundationalist, that the epistemological critique has 
not been pushed far enough, but rather that the critique should never 
have got going in the first case. It is not the common-sense exception 
that is mistaken, it is the attempt at epistemological foundation that is 
the exception and mistaken. Epistemologists like Locke fail to be 
guided by the evidence of precisely that common-sense that in any 
event is allowed to creep in the back-door.  
 But A Grammar offers more than a defense of common-sense, 
though indeed it does so in a manner invested with something of the 
spirit of Aristotle and the letter of Bishop Butler. It also attempts to 
change the dominant Lockean and post-Lockean picture of the mind 
as passive. On Newman's view, given this picture of the mind, it 
should come as no surprise that once Locke and his empiricist 
followers have determined that reason has as its ideal aim irrefutable 
evidence, it follows that being reasonable consists in the strength of 
the mind's conviction being strictly correlatable with the degree of less 
than irrefutable evidence almost inevitably the case in anything other 
than trivial matters and perhaps even there also. What is 
fundamentally wrong with this picture of the mind is that it seriously 
underestimates the reality of the essential activity of the mind. The 
higher part of the mind, and not simply the lower part of the mind, 
whether the passion or imagination of empiricism, is crucially 
involved in coming to decisions about reality. The mind is not simply 
a computer of probabilities, but in advance and excess of evidence 
can commit to something as true that has less than irrefutable 
evidential warrant. For Newman the ``can'' is not linked, as in liberal 
epistemology, with an ``ought not.'' For such leaps beyond the 
19
O'Regan: Newman's Anti-Liberalism
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1992
 CYRIL O'REGAN 
 
102 
evidence are not intrinsically irrational, examples of sheer caprice, as 
liberal epistemology would have it. Newman wishes to deny that the 
activity displayed by the mind in its excess over evidence is purely 
voluntaristic, and certainly not capricious. 
 The argument that the mind often, indeed usually, assents in the 
absence of irrefutable evidence is for Newman a truth not only of 
experience, but of the larger philosophical tradition which was 
convinced of the rationality of such a manoeuver even if the upshot 
was that this mode of rationality did not conform to the canons of 
demonstrative knowledge. Rather than generalizing Tertullian's credo 
quia absurdum, Newman considers himself to be engaged in bringing 
back into religious epistemology the less narrowly conceived view of 
reason first propounded by Aristotle and amended and adjusted in the 
context of Butler's conflict with Lockean epistemology in the 
eighteenth century. A Grammar accepts the less restrictive Aristotelian 
view, and seems to find particularly congenial the view Aristotle 
announces in the Nichomachean Ethics to the effect that it is 
unreasonable to expect objective certitude in the specifically human 
sphere, given the degree of complication. 
 Yet non-correspondence to the strictest demands of demonstrative 
knowledge does not vitiate a particular sphere of inquiry or interest. 
Something less than objective certainty is permissible if the particular 
sphere under investigation is not amenable to such certainty, where, in 
Newman's language, ``strict inference'' is out of the question, and only 
``informal inference'' is realistically possible. Indeed, the claim for 
demonstrative knowledge, and indeed even seeking after it, in areas of 
investigation that do not support such pride, is judged to be 
wrongheaded if not mischievous. There are, of course, special 
difficulties why such seeking is particularly hubristic in matters of 
religion. In concert with what he had said in his Anglican period, in A 
Grammar and Essay on Development Newman suggests that the 
reason why knowledge cannot be absolute in religious matters lies in 
the very nature of the religious object itself which as infinite is 
objectively and not simply subjectively mysterious. The ultimate 
religious intendum, that is, ``God,'' exceeds any and all cognitive 
attempt. No raid, or succession of raids, on the absolute could 
logically succeed.  
 A Grammar also provides Newman's classic defense of the 
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principle of tradition-forming judgment. Newman argues that if 
judgments or assents are not without grounds, because they do not 
satisfy the canons of a restrictive, reductionist rationality, they are also 
not without backgrounds which definitely ought not to be summarily 
dismissed as irrelevant as is the wont of liberal epistemology. Real 
judgments are made by human beings in the context of background 
assumptions which are themselves not grounded and which for the 
most part are not even investigated. For Newman an open 
non-reductive realist epistemology ought to take background as well 
as foreground into consideration. In A Grammar Newman completes 
the rehabilitation of prejudice or tradition that received a preliminary 
airing in the Oxford University Sermons. Before Gadamer, Newman 
argued for the validity of tradition over against the failed 
Enlightenment and liberal attempt to securely found knowledge by 
linking it to empirical evidence. 
 Of course, the grounds for revision are not the same in every 
respect, nor can it be claimed with any definitiveness that 
rehabilitation of the value and validity of tradition involves for 
Newman any essential rethinking of the nature of truth, as is definitely 
the case with Gadamer's espousal of the Heideggerian model of truth 
as disclosure. Nevertheless, in A Grammar, as earlier in the Oxford 
University Sermons, while Newman shows himself aware of the 
potential for what is now referred to in philosophical literature as 
``ideological deformation,'' he also shares some of the vulnerability of 
a Gadamer to a Habermasian and Habermasian-like critique. 
Traditional judgment may not always be wrong as liberalism tends to 
suggest; it may not even often be wrong. But it stretches plausibility to 
claim against those who would criticize it that it is always right. 
Newman is, as is Gadamer, sensible enough not to make any such 
claim, and yet, as with Gadamer in Truth and Method, there is perhaps 
insufficient attention to the possibility of prejudice in the pejorative 
sense of the term and insufficient information provided as to how 
judgment on religious matters protects itself against deformation, and 
the nature and scope of the sources available for such protection. One 
can, however, safely conjecture that were Newman to explicitly raise 
and answer these questions it is highly likely that he would argue for 
critical resources of an internal rather than external kind. 
 By way of closing this brief and altogether inadequate account of 
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the continuity of anti-liberal principles in the Catholic Newman I 
should say a few words about the qualifiers Newman felt ought 
necessarily to be added in the Catholic situation. Given the de facto 
anti-liberal constitution of Catholicism in both its theology as well as 
its ecclesial practice, Newman felt called upon to take account of, and 
set some protection against, Christianity deforming itself by defining 
itself in a reactively, perhaps even reactionary, anti-liberal fashion. 
From a host of possible examples of such supplements let me just 
mention two. 
 First, if against the corrosive of liberalism Newman insisted on 
the dogmatic principle, this was not intended to encourage lazy 
acceptance of credenda only incompletely understood and to 
positively discourage religious inquiry. If Newman wished to prune 
somewhat the burgeoning culture of experience, he by no means 
wished to exclude it. Newman is quite clear that not all elements of 
the divine mystery are experiencable. As A Grammar and Essay on 
Development both point out, such definitely is the case with regard to 
the nature of God as Trinity, which is a reflective extrapolation from 
its compact revelation in scripture. Not only would it not have 
occurred to the human mind to have defined God thus, even after such 
revelation or the articulation of such revelation, the mind cannot 
experientially apprehend the mystery of the triune God. But this does 
not appear to be the situation with regard to every aspect of the great 
religious fact or mystery. In A Grammar Newman is quite clear that 
certain features of this most complex of Christian mysteries can be 
grasped cognitively, just as in the Essay on Development Newman 
does not rule out the possibility that it is something like religious 
experience, albeit communally mediated experience, which is decisive 
in the last instance in determining the superiority of the orthodox view 
of Christ. 
 Newman in his Catholic texts seems to be engaged in amending 
the claims of experience rather than excluding its claims altogether. 
From a theological perspective Newman seems to be suggesting in 
fact that growth in the Christian life is growth in religious experience, 
not as an indiscriminate cognitive or trans-cognitive quantum, but 
rather as the personal appropriation by the subject of the truths of the 
tradition. In this sense not only did Newman not exclude experience, 
he positively encouraged it. As adulthood is the telos of the Christian 
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life, experiential, and not simply notional, apprehension is the 
heuristic which guides Christian witness. If because of the very nature 
of the divine, crucial aspects of the divine admit only of notional 
apprehension, this provides no warrant for sloth in avoiding bringing 
to experience that which does admit such bringing. As Newman keeps 
the door open for experience, he also keeps the door open for 
religious inquiry, and he does so in two different ways. On the one 
hand he suggests the continual necessity of attempts to explain 
theologically the great Christian mysteries, while insisting that these 
mysteries be approached with due reverence and that the human mind 
neither overestimate its competence nor set the canons of 
meaningfulness according to its own presumptive lights. On the other 
hand, as is clear from texts such as the Essay on Development and 
Consultation of the Faithful, Newman understands the process of 
doctrinal formulation, as well as elucidation, to be open, and he 
understands that this process will, and ought to, continue as long as 
there exists in the Church the miraculous coincidence of fidelity and 
creativity.  
 This brings me to my second and final supplement to Newman's 
championing of anti-liberal principles. While Newman in his Catholic 
period continued to validate traditionary judgment in both its implicit 
as well as explicit forms in matters of religion, he in nowise 
maintained that they could not be challenged by individual 
conscience. Conscience is an extremely important concept in A 
Grammar and is regarded as inalienable. Furthermore, in the 
Apologia Newman uses all his considerable rhetorical skill in 
rebutting Kingsley's view of the traditionary bias of Catholicism, 
which for him demanded a sacrificium intellectus of its members, and 
fatally discouraged even the semblance of intellectual honesty. For 
Newman, if the Catholic Church is the bastion of the rights of 
traditionary over private judgment, this sets limits to, but does not 
extirpate, conscience from the province of Catholicism. While 
Newman enjoins that in the event of conflict between the communally 
held view and a competing private view it is the former that should be 
given the benefit of the doubt, and that the individual should submit 
himself or herself to the closest introspective scrutiny, in the last 
instance individual conscience can legitimately challenge the 
communally held view, and successfully challenge it. 
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 Newman is aware of a number of such successful challenges 
throughout history which assisted the Church in resisting deformation 
and remaining faithful to its substance and mission. He sees no reason 
why such will not be the case in the future. But the mantle of prophet 
ought not to be confused with superficial private opinion which does 
not submit itself to self-scrutiny and which asserts it is right not on the 
basis of special credentials but on the basis that it holds a particular 
view with conviction. Newman could never concede that the claim of 




 No illusion is entertained in this paper that either the reality of the 
presence of a consistent set of anti-liberal principles or their 
perdurance over the course of Newman's literary production have 
been ``proven'' or ``demonstrated.'' Awareness of this is indicated by 
the fact that the word ``demonstrated'' was used in this paper only in 
an inverted comma sense. For demonstration in the strict sense, a 
much more extensive textual terrain would need to have been 
covered, and the texts consulted plumbed more deeply than is possible 
within the confines of an essay. Still I hope I have proposed at least a 
prima facie case for supporting Newman's own reading of the 
depth-grammar of his philosophical-theological position, a case not 
weakened very much by omission from discussion of the fourth and 
fifth anti-liberal principles, for at least in the case of one of those 
principles, i.e., number five, all that would be required is a quick 
presentation of Newman's great discussion of Natural and Revealed 
Religion that closes A Grammar. If it is this consistency and tenacity 
which makes of Newman for modernity an emblematic ``old man'' 
who refuses Enlightenment blandishments and unmasks its pretended 
and/or delusory nakedness, it is the coherence of his anti-liberal 
counter-proposal which makes him a valuable conversation partner 
with twentieth-century philosophy and theology. But the illumination 
is not uni-directional. Newman is informed as well as informing, 
some of his insights gaining weight by being put in richer systematic 
contexts, some of his suggestions pointing the way out of 
philosophical and theological dead-ends.  
 Indeed, one might risk the opinion that it is in this conversation 
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rather than in Newman haliolatry or historical studies that the true 
value of Newman lies. For to evoke the Italian commentator and critic 
of Hegel, Benedetto Croce, what is living and what is dead in 
Newman is ultimately decided by this conversation. The present 
interpretive scene shows some signs of beginning to get this 
conversation off the ground. This is especially the case with regard to 
Newman's religious epistemology, where Newman's anti-Lockean 
position has been explored via the epistemological outlook of the later 
Wittgenstein as well as Michael Polyani (e.g., by J. Ferreire) and read 
in the light of the experiential dominant in modernity's construal of 
religious sensibility (e.g., by Nicholas Lasch). Yet even here, in 
plausibly the most developed area of the desired conversation, much 
remains to be done. Discussion of Newman and twentieth-century 
rapprochement in the area of religious epistemology could be 
broadened to include the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer and the 
critical theory of Habermas, and might even conceivably become 
ecumenic enough to include the post-Nietzschean stream in 
contemporary philosophy, both continental and analytic. Moreover, 
too often read as gravitating to one or other side of the 
propositionalist-fideistic either-or, Newman's view of religious 
mystery calls out not only for a definitive statement regarding its 
patristic provenance, but for comparison with exemplary 
twentieth-century Catholic accounts provided by Karl Rahner and 
Hans Urs von Balthasar. Here the mutual questioning concerning the 
christological and trinitarian mysteries has a particular call on critical 
attention.  
 Conversation has not even begun in other areas which are crying 
out for critical treatment, areas like religious anthropology and 
phenomenology. It is only in and through such discussion that one 
remains faithful to Newman. For not only is it true that the child of the 
Enlightenment is continually replicated, there is also and always a 
considerable amount of metamorphosis, for the Enlightenment child 
of whom we spoke in the preface is a master of disguise, even if all 
the disguises have somehow or other something to do with nakedness. 
Repetition of Newman is not enough, or if so only in the amended 
Kierkegaardian sense of repetition forwards rather than backwards, 
that is, repetition that appropriates a past to the extent to which it is 
open to the future and its contingencies and allows flexibility of 
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response in dealing with new emergencies and crises. Genuinely 
repeating Newman may thus involve even a margin of literal 
infidelity, so that one is liberated into Newman's critical ethos which 
availed of every and any intellectual tool at its disposal to expose the 
deficiencies of a phenomenon that is forever undergoing mutation. 
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